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Abstract. Interpretability is an emerging area of research in trustworthy ma-
chine learning. Safe deployment of machine learning system mandates that the
prediction and its explanation be reliable and robust. Recently, it has been shown
that the explanations could be manipulated easily by adding visually impercepti-
ble perturbations to the input while keeping the model’s prediction intact. In this
work, we study the problem of attributional robustness (i.e. models having robust
explanations) by showing an upper bound for attributional vulnerability in terms
of spatial correlation between the input image and its explanation map. We pro-
pose a training methodology that learns robust features by minimizing this upper
bound using soft-margin triplet loss. Our methodology of robust attribution train-
ing (ART) achieves the new state-of-the-art attributional robustness measure by a
margin of ≈ 6-18 % on several standard datasets, ie. SVHN, CIFAR-10 and GT-
SRB. We further show the utility of the proposed robust training technique (ART)
in the downstream task of weakly supervised object localization by achieving
the new state-of-the-art performance on CUB-200 dataset. Code is available at
https://github.com/nupurkmr9/Attributional-Robustness.
Keywords: Attributional robustness; Adversarial robustness; Explainable deep
learning
1 Introduction
Attribution methods [12, 53, 59, 56, 55, 62, 54] are an increasingly popular class of
explanation techniques that aim to highlight relevant input features responsible for
model’s prediction. These techniques are extensively used with deep learning models in
risk-sensitive and safety-critical applications such as healthcare [5, 38, 64, 27], where
they provide a human user with visual validation of the features used by the model for
predictions. E.g., in computer-assisted diagnosis, [64] showed that predictions with at-
tribution maps increased accuracy of retina specialists above that of unassisted reader
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Fig. 1: Illustration of targeted manipulation [15] of different attribution maps using the target
attribution of (a). Here, (b) Integrated Gradients [62], (c) GradCAM++ [12] and (d) GradSHAP
[34] blocks show : Top (b), (c), (d) original image and its attribution map; Bottom (b), (c), (d)
perturbed image and its attribution map. Both original and perturbed images of (b), (c) and (d)
are classified correctly by the ResNet-50 trained model on CUB-200 [69] in the class of Long
Tailed Jaeger, Yellow Breasted Chat and Acadian Flycatcher respectively.
or model alone. Also, in [27], the authors improve the analysis of skin lesions by lever-
aging explanation maps of prediction.
It has been recently demonstrated that one could construct targeted [15] and un-
targeted perturbations [19, 13] that can arbitrarily manipulate attribution maps without
affecting the model’s prediction. This issue further weakens the cause of safe applica-
tion of machine learning algorithms. We show an illustrative example of attribution-
based attacks for image classifiers over different attribution methods in Fig. 1. This
vulnerability leads to newer challenges for attribution methods, as well as robust train-
ing techniques. The intuition of attributional robustness is that if the inputs are visually
indistinguishable with the same model prediction, then interpretation maps should also
remain the same.
As one of the first efforts, [13] recently proposed a training methodology that aims
to obtain models having robust integrated gradient [62] attributions. In addition to being
an early effort, the instability of this training methodology, as discussed in [13], limits
its usability in the broader context of robust training in computer vision. In this paper,
we build upon this work by obtaining an upper bound for attributional vulnerability
as a function of spatial correlation between the input image and its explanation map.
Furthermore, we also introduce a training technique that minimizes this upper bound
to provide attributional robustness. In particular, we introduce a training methodology
for attributional robustness that uses soft-margin triplet loss to increase the spatial cor-
relation of input with its attribution map. The triplet loss considers input image as the
anchor, gradient of the correct class logit with respect to input as the positive and gradi-
ent of the incorrect class with highest logit value with respect to input as the negative.
We show empirically how this choice results in learning of robust and interpretable
features that help in other downstream weakly supervised tasks.
Existing related efforts in deep learning research are largely focused on robust-
ness to adversarial perturbations [20, 63], which are imperceptible perturbations which,
when added to input, drastically change the neural networks prediction. While adver-
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sarial robustness has been explored significantly in recent years, there has been limited
progress made on the front of attributional robustness, which we seek to highlight in
this work. Our main contributions can be summarized as:
– We tackle the problem of attribution vulnerability and provide an upper bound for
it as a function of spatial correlation between the input and its attribution map [56].
We then propose ART, a new training method that aims to minimize this bound to
learn attributionally robust model.
– Our method outperforms prior work in this direction, and achieves state-of-the-art
attributional robustness on Integrated Gradient [62] based attribution method.
– We empirically show that the proposed methodology also induces immunity to ad-
versarial perturbations and common perturbations [23] on standard vision datasets
that is comparable to the state-of-the-art adversarial training technique [36].
– We show the utility of ART for other computer vision tasks such as weakly super-
vised object localization and segmentation. Specifically, ART achieves state-of-the-
art performance in weakly supervised object localization on CUB-200 [69] dataset.
2 Related Work
Our work is associated with various recent development made in the field of expla-
nation methods, robustness to input distribution shifts and weakly supervised object
localization. We hence describe earlier efforts in each of these directions below.
Visual Explanation Methods: Various explanation methods have been proposed that
focus on producing posterior explanations for the model’s decisions. A popular ap-
proach to do so is to attribute the predictions to the set of input features [56, 60, 55,
62, 54, 7]. Sample-based explanation methods [30, 71] leverage previously seen ex-
amples to describe the prediction of the model. Concept-based explanation techniques
[8, 29] aim to explain the decision of the model by high-level concepts. There has also
been work that explores interpretability as a built-in property of architecture inspired
by the characteristics of linear models [4]. [79, 16] provide a survey of interpretation
techniques. Another class of explanation methods, commonly referred to as attribution
techniques, can be broadly divided into three categories - gradient/back-propagation,
propagation and perturbation based methods. Gradient-based methods attribute an im-
portance score for each pixel by using the derivative of a class score with respect to in-
put features [56, 55, 62]. Propagation-based techniques [7, 54, 77] leverage layer-wise
propagation of feature importance to calculate the attribution maps. Perturbation-based
interpretation methods generate attribution maps by examining the change in prediction
of the model when the input image is perturbed [74, 47, 49]. In this work, we primarily
report results on the attribution method of Integrated Gradients IG [62] that satisfies
desirable axiomatic properties and was also used in the previous work [13].
Robustness of Attribution Maps: Recently, there have been a few efforts [80, 19, 15,
13, 3] that have explored the robustness of attribution maps, which we call attributional
robustness in this work. The authors of [19, 15, 80] study the robustness of a network’s
attribution maps and show that the attribution maps can be significantly manipulated via
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imperceptible input perturbations while preserving the classifier’s prediction. Recently,
Chen, J. et al.[13] proposed a robust attribution training methodology, which is one of
the first attempts at making an image classification model attributionally robust and is
the current state of the art. The method minimizes the norm of difference in Integrated
Gradients [62] of an original and perturbed image during training to achieve attribu-
tional robustness. In this work, we approach the problem from a different perspective
of maintaining spatial alignment between an image and its saliency map.
Adversarial Perturbation and Robustness: Adversarial attacks can be broadly catego-
rized into two types: White-box [39, 36, 10, 70] and Black-box attacks [25, 66, 2, 46].
Several proposed defense techniques have been shown to be ineffective to adaptive
adversarial attacks [6, 33, 10, 9]. Adversarial training [21, 36, 58], which is a defense
technique that continuously augments the data with adversarial examples while training,
is largely considered the current state-of-the-art to achieve adversarial robustness. [76]
characterizes the trade-off between accuracy and robustness for classification problems
and propose a regularized adversarial training method. Recent work of [48] proposes a
regularizer that encourages the loss to behave linearly in the vicinity of the training data,
and [75] improves the adversarial training by also minimizing the convolutional feature
distance between the perturbed and clean examples. Prior works have also attempted to
improve adversarial robustness using gradient regularization that minimizes the Frobe-
nius norm of the Hessian of the classification loss with respect to input[50, 40, 35] or
weights [26]. For a comprehensive review of the work done in the area of adversarial
examples, please refer [72, 1]. We show in our work that in addition to providing at-
tributional robustness, our proposed method helps in achieving significant performance
improvement on downstream tasks such as weakly supervised object localization. We
hence briefly discuss earlier efforts on this task below.
Weakly Supervised Object Localization (WSOL): The problem of WSOL aims to iden-
tify the location of the object in a scene using only image-level labels, and without any
location annotations. Generally, rich labeled data is scarcely available, and its collection
is expensive and time-consuming. Learning from weak supervision is hence promising
as it requires less rich labels and has the potential to scale. A common problem with
most previous approaches is that the model only identifies the most discriminative part
of the object rather than the complete object. For example, in the case of a bird, the
model may rely on the beak region for classification than the entire bird’s shape. In
WSOL task, ADL [14], the current state-of-the-art method, uses an attention-based
dropout layer while training the model that promotes the classification model to also
focus on less discriminative parts of the image. For getting the bounding box from the
model, ADL and similar other techniques in this domain first extract attribution maps,
generally CAM-based[81], for each image and then fit a bounding box as described in
[81]. We now present our methodology.
3 Attributional Robustness Training: Methodology
Given an input image x ∈ [0, 1]n with true label y ∈ {1...k}, we consider a neural
network model fθ : Rn → Rk with ReLU activation function that classifies x into
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one of k classes as argmax f(x)i where i ∈ {1...k}. Here, f(x)i is the ith logit of
f(x). Attribution map A(x, f(x)i) : Rn → Rn with respect to a given class i assigns
an importance score to each input pixel of x based on its relevance to the model for
predicting the class i.
3.1 Attribution Manipulation
It was shown recently [15, 19] that for standard models fθ, it is possible to manipulate
the attribution mapA(x, f(x)y) (denoted asA(x) for simplicity in the rest of the paper)
with visually imperceptible perturbation δ in the input by optimizing the following loss
function.
argmax
δ∈B
D[A(x+ δ, f(x+ δ)y), A(x, f(x)y)]
subject to: argmax(f(x)) = argmax(f(x+ δ)) = y
(1)
where B is an lp ball of radius  centered at x and D is a dissimilarity function to
measure the change between attribution maps. The manipulation was shown for various
perturbation-based and gradient-based attribution methods.
This vulnerability in neural network-based classification models suggests that the
model relies on features different from what humans perceive as important for its pre-
diction. The goal of attributional robustness is to mitigate this vulnerability and ensure
that attribution maps of two visually indistinguishable images are also nearly identical.
In the next section, we propose a new training methodology for attributional robust-
ness motivated from the observation that feature importance in image space has a high
spatial correlation with the input image for robust models [65, 18].
3.2 Attributional Robustness Training (ART)
Given an input image x ∈ Rn with ground truth label y ∈ {1...k} and a classification
model fθ, the gradient-based feature importance score is defined as ∇xf(x)i : i ∈
{1...k} and denoted as gi(x) in the rest of the paper. For achieving attributional robust-
ness, we need to minimize the attribution vulnerability to attacks as defined in Equation
1. Attribution vulnerability can be formulated as the maximum possible change in gy(x)
in a -neighborhood of x if A is taken as gradient attribution method [56] and D is a
distance measure in some norm ||.|| i.e.
max
δ∈B
||gy(x+ δ)− gy(x)|| (2)
We show that Equation 2 is upper bounded by the maximum of the distance between
gy(x+ δ) and x+ δ for δ in  neighbourhood of x.
||gy(x+ δ)− gy(x)|| = ||gy(x+ δ)− (x+ δ)− (gy(x)− x) + δ||
≤ ||gy(x+ δ)− (x+ δ)||+ ||gy(x)− x||+ ||δ||
≤ ||gy(x+ δ)− (x+ δ)||+ max
δ∈B
||gy(x+ δ)− (x+ δ)||+ ||δ||
(3)
Taking max on both sides:
max
δ∈B
||gy(x+ δ)− gy(x))|| ≤ 2 max
δ∈B
||gy(x+ δ)− (x+ δ)||+ |||| (4)
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Fig. 2: Block diagram summarizing our training technique for ART. Dashed line represents back-
ward gradient flow, and bold lines denotes forward pass of the neural network.
Leveraging existing understanding [52, 24] that minimizing the distance between
two quantities can benefit from a negative anchor, we use a triplet loss formulation as
defined in Equation 5 with image x as an anchor, gy(x) as positive sample and gi
∗
(x)
as negative sample. More details about the selection of the optimization objective 5
and choice for the negative sample can be found in Appendix A.1. Hence to achieve
attributional robustness, we propose a training technique ART that encourages high
spatial correlation between gy(x) and x by optimizing Lattr which is a triplet loss [24]
with soft margin on cosine distance between gi(x) and x i.e.
Lattr(x, y) = log
(
1 + exp
(− (d(gi∗(x), x)− d(gy(x), x))))
where d(gi(x), x) = 1− g
i(x).x
||gi(x)||2.||x||2 ; i
∗ = argmax
i 6=y
f(x)i
(5)
Hence, the classification training objective for ART methodology is:
minimize
θ
E
(x,y)
[
Lce(x+ δ, y) + λ Lattr(x+ δ, y)
]
where δ = argmax
||δ||∞<
Lattr(x+ δ, y)
(6)
Here Lce is the standard cross-entropy loss. The optimization of Lattr involves com-
puting gradient of f(x)i with respect to input x which suffers from the problem of van-
ishing second derivative in case of ReLU activation, i.e. ∂2fi/∂x2 ≈ 0. To alleviate this,
following previous works [15, 13], we replace ReLU with softplus non-linearities while
optimizing Lattr as it has a well-defined second derivative. The softplus approximates
to ReLU as the value of β in softplusβ(x) =
log(1+eβx)
β increases. Note that optimiza-
tion of Lce follows the usual ReLU activation pathway. Thus, our training methodology
consists of two steps: first, we calculate a perturbed image x˜ = x + δ that maximizes
Lattr through iterative projected gradient descent; secondly, we use x˜ as the training
point on which Lce and Lattr is minimized with their relative weightage controlled by
the hyper-parameter λ.
Note that the square root of cosine distance for unit l2 norm vectors as used in our
formulation of Lattr is a valid distance metric and is related to the Euclidean distance
as shown in Appendix A.2. Through experiments, we empirically show that minimiz-
ing the upper bound in Equation 4 as our training objective increases the attributional
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Algorithm 1: Attributional Robustness Training (ART)
1 Input: Classification model fθ , training data X = {(xi, yi)}, batch size b, number of
epochs E, number of attack steps a, step-size for iterative perturbation α, softplus
parameter β, weight of Lattr loss λ.
2 for epoch ∈ {1, 2, ..., E} do
3 Get mini-batch x, y = {(x1, y1)...(xb, yb)}
4 x˜ = x+ Uniform[−,+]
5 for i=1,2, ... , a do
6 x˜ = x˜+ α ∗ sign(∇xLattr(x˜, y))
7 x˜ = Proj`∞(x˜)
8 end
9 i∗ = argmax
i6=y
f(x)i
10 Calculate gy(x˜) = ∇xf(x˜)y
11 Calculate gi
∗
(x˜) = ∇xf(x˜)i∗ ; // We calculate gy(x˜) and gi∗(x˜) using
softplusβ activation as described in Section 3.2
12 loss = Lce(x˜, y) + λ · Lattr(x˜, y)
13 Update θ using loss
14 end
15 return fθ .
robustness of the model by a significant margin. The block diagram for our training
methodology is shown in Fig 2, and its pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 1.
3.3 Connection to Adversarial Robustness
For a given input image x, an adversarial example is a slightly perturbed image x′
such that ||x − x′|| is small in some norm but the model fθ classifies x′ incorrectly.
Adversarial examples are calculated by optimizing a loss function L which is large
when f(x) 6= y:
xadv = argmax
x′:||x′−x||p<
L(θ, x′, y) (7)
where L can be the cross-entropy loss, for example. For an axiomatic attribution func-
tion A which satisfies the completeness axiom i.e.
∑n
j=1A(x)j = f(x)y , it can be
shown that |f(x)y − f(x′)y| < ||A(x)−A(x′)||1, as below:
|f(x)y − f(x′)y| =|
∑n
j=1A(x)j −
∑n
j=1A(x
′)j |
≤∑nj=1 |A(x)j −A(x′)j |
=||A(x)−A(x′)||1
(8)
The above relationship connects adversarial robustness to attributional robustness
as the maximum change in f(x)y is upper bounded by the maximum change in attri-
bution map of x in its  neighborhood. Also, it was shown [65] recently that for an
adversarially robust model, gradient-based feature importance map gy(x) has high spa-
tial correlation with the image x and it highlights the perceptually relevant features of
the image. For classifiers with a locally affine approximation like a DNN with ReLU
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Table 1: Attributional and adversarial robustness of different approaches on various datasets.
Hyper-parameters for attributional attack are same as [13]. Similarity measures used are IN:Top-k
intersection, K:kendall’s tau rank order correlation. The values denote similarity between attri-
bution maps of original and perturbed examples [19] based on Intergrated Gradient method.
Dataset Approach Attributional Robustness AccuracyIN K Natural PGD-40 Attack
CIFAR-10
Natural 40.25 49.17 95.26 0.
PGD-10 [36] 69.00 72.27 87.32 44.07
ART 92.90 91.76 89.84 37.58
SVHN
Natural 60.43 56.50 95.66 0.
PGD-7 [36] 39.67 55.56 92.84 50.12
ART 61.37 72.60 95.47 43.56
GTSRB
Natural 68.74 76.48 99.43 19.9
IG Norm [13] 74.81 75.55 97.02 75.24
IG-SUM Norm [13] 74.04 76.84 95.68 77.12
PGD-7 [36] 86.13 88.42 98.36 87.49
ART 91.96 89.34 98.47 84.66
Flower
Natural 38.22 56.43 93.91 0.
IG Norm [13] 64.68 75.91 85.29 24.26
IG-SUM Norm [13] 66.33 79.74 82.35 47.06
PGD-7 [36] 80.84 84.14 92.64 69.85
ART 79.84 84.87 93.21 33.08
activations, Etmann et al.[18] establish theoretical connection between adversarial ro-
bustness, and the correlation of gy(x) with image x. [18] shows that for a given image
x, its distance to the nearest distance boundary is upper-bounded by the dot product be-
tween x and gy(x). The authors of [18] showed that increasing adversarial robustness
increases the correlation between gy(x) and x. Moreover, this correlation is related to
the increase in attributional robustness of model as we show in Section 3.2.
3.4 Downstream Task: Weakly supervised Object localization (WSOL)
As an additional benefit of our approach, we show its improved performance on a down-
stream task - Weakly supervised Object localization (WSOL), in this case. The problem
of WSOL deals with detecting objects where only class label information of images is
available, and the ground truth bounding box location is inaccessible. Generally, the
pipeline for obtaining bounding box locations in WSOL relies on attribution maps.
Also, the task of object detection is widely used to validate the quality of attribution
maps empirically. Since our proposed training methodology ART promotes attribution
map to be invariant to small perturbations in input, it leads to better attribution maps
identifying the complete object instead of focusing on only the most discriminative part
of the object. We validate this empirically by using attribution maps obtained from our
model for bounding-box detection on the CUB dataset and obtaining new state-of-the-
art localization results.
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4 Experiments and Results
In this section, we first describe the implementation details of ART and evaluation set-
ting for measuring the attributional and adversarial robustness. We then show the per-
formance of ART on the downstream task of weakly supervised image localization task.
4.1 Attributional and Adversarial Robustness
Baselines: We compare our training methodology with the following approaches:
– Natural: Standard training with minimization of cross entropy classification loss.
– PGD-n: Adversarially trained model with n-step PGD attack as in [36], which is
typically used by work in this area [13].
– IG Norm and IG-SUM Norm [13]: Current state-of-the-art robust attribution train-
ing technique.
Datasets and Implementation Details: To study the efficacy of our methodology,
we benchmark on the following standard vision datasets: CIFAR-10 [32], SVHN [42],
GTSRB [61] and Flower [43]. For CIFAR-10, GTSRB and Flower datasets, we use
Wideresnet-28-10 [73] model architecture for Natural, PGD-10 and ART. For SVHN,
we use WideResNet-40-2 [73] architecture. We use the perturbation  = 8/255 in `∞-
norm for ART and PGD-n as in [36, 13]. We use λ = 0.5, a = 3 and β = 50 for all
experiments in the paper. For training, we use SGD optimizer with step-wise learning
rate schedule. More details about datasets and training hyper-parameters are given in
Appendix A.3.
Evaluation: For evaluating attributional robustness, we follow [13] and present our
results with Integrated Gradient (IG)-based attribution maps. We show attributional
robustness accuracy of ART on other attribution methods in Section 5. IG satisfies
several theoretical properties desirable for an attribution method, e.g. sensitivity and
completeness axioms and is defined as:
IG(x, f(x)i) = (x− x)
∫ 1
t=0
∇xf(x+ t(x− x))idt (9)
where x is a suitable baseline at which the function prediction is neutral. For computing
perturbed image x˜ on which IG(x˜) changes drastically from IG(x), we perform Itera-
tive Feature Importance Attack (IFIA) proposed by Ghorbani et al.[19] with `∞ bound
of  = 8/255 as used by previous work [13].
For assessing similarity between A(x) and perturbed image A(x˜), we use Top-k
intersection (IN ) and Kendall’s tau coefficient (K) similar to [13]. Kendall’s tau co-
efficient is a measure of similarity of ordering when ranked by values, and therefore is
a suitable metric for comparing attribution maps. Top-k intersection measures the per-
centage of common indices in top-k values of attribution map of x and x˜. We report
average of IN and K metric over random 1000 samples of test-set. More details about
the attack methodology and evaluation parameters can be found in Appendix A.3. For
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Fig. 3: Qualitative examples of gradient attribution map [56] for different models on CIFAR-10.
Top to bottom: Image; attribution maps for Natural, PGD-10 and ART trained models
Fig. 4: Random samples (of resolution 32 × 32) generated using a CIFAR-10 robustly trained
ART classifier
evaluating adversarial robustness, we perform 40 step PGD attack [36] using cross-
entropy loss with `∞ bound of  = 8/255 and report the model accuracy on adversarial
examples. Table 1 compares attributional and adversarial robustness across different
datasets and training approaches. Our proposed approach ART achieves state-of-the-
art attributional robustness on attribution attacks [19] when compared with baselines.
We also observe that ART consistently achieves higher test accuracy than [36] and has
adversarial robustness significantly greater than that of the Natural model.
Qualitative study of input-gradients for ART: Motivated by [65] which claims that
adversarially trained models exhibits human-aligned gradients (agree with human saliency),
we studied the same with (ART), and the results are shown in Fig 3. Qualitative study
of input-gradients shows a high degree of spatial alignment between the object and
the gradient. We also show image generation from random seeds in Fig 4 using robust
ART model as done in [51]. The image generation process involves maximization of
the class score of the desired class starting from a random seed which is sampled from
some class-conditional seed distribution as defined in [51].
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Fig. 5: Comparison of heatmap and estimated bounding box by VGG model trained via our
method and ADL on CUB dataset; top row corresponds to our method, and the bottom row
corresponds to ADL. The red bounding box is ground truth and green bounding box corresponds
to the estimated box
Table 2: Weakly Supervised Localization on CUB dataset. Bold text refers to the best GT-Known
Loc and Top-1 Loc for each model architecture. ∗ denotes directly reported from the paper. #
denotes our implementation of ADL from the official code released by [14]2
Model Method Saliency Method Top-1 Acc
Grad CAM
GT-Known Loc Top-1 Loc GT-Known Loc Top-1 Loc
ResNet50-SE ADL [14] - - - 62.29∗ 80.34∗
ResNet50
ADL# 52.93 43.78 56.85 47.53 80.0
Natural 50.2 42.0 60.37 50.0 81.12
PGD-7[36] 66.73 47.48 55.24 39.45 70.3
ART 82.65 65.22 58.87 46.02 77.51
VGG-GAP
ADL# 63.18 43.59 69.36 50.88 70.31
Natural 72.54 53.81 48.75 35.03 72.94
ART 76.50 57.74 52.88 40.75 74.51
4.2 Weakly Supervised Image Localization
This task relies on the attribution map obtained from the classification model to estimate
a bounding box for objects. We compare our approach with ADL [14]3 on the CUB
dataset, which has ground truth bounding box of 5794 bird images. We adopt similar
processing steps as ADL for predicting bounding boxes except that we use gradient
attribution map ∇xf(x)y instead of CAM [81]. As a post-processing step, we convert
the attribution map to grayscale, normalize it and then apply a mean filtering of 3 × 3
kernel over it. Then a bounding box is fit over this heatmap to localize the object.
We perform experiments on Resnet-50 [22] and VGG [57] architectures. We use `∞
bound of  = 2/255 for ART and PGD-7 training on the CUB dataset. For evaluation,
we used similar metrics as in [14] i.e. GT-Known Loc: Intersection over Union (IoU) of
estimated box and ground truth bounding box is atleast 0.5 and ground truth is known;
Top-1 Loc: prediction is correct and IoU of bounding box is atleast 0.5; Top-1 Acc: top-
1 classification accuracy. Details about dataset and training hyper-parameters are given
in Appendix B.1. Our approach results in higher GT-Known Loc and Top-1 Loc for both
Resnet-50 and VGG-GAP [14] model as shown in Table 2. We also show qualitative
comparison of the bounding box estimated by our approach with [14] in Fig 5.
3 https://github.com/junsukchoe/ADL/tree/master/Pytorch
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Table 3: Top-1 accuracy of different models on perturbed variants of test-set (GN:Gaussian
noise; SN: Shot noise; IN: Impulse noise; DB: Defocus blur; Gl-B: Glass blur; MB: Motion blur;
ZB: Zoom blur; S: Snow; F: Fog; B: Brightness; C: Contrast; E: Elastic transform; P: Pixelation
noise; J: JPEG compression; Sp-N: Speckle Noise)
Models GN SN IN DB Gl-B MB ZB S F B C E P J Sp-N
Natural 49.16 61.42 59.22 83.55 53.84 79.16 79.18 84.53 91.6 94.37 87.63 84.44 74.12 79.76 65.04
PGD-10 83.32 84.33 73.73 83.09 81.27 79.60 82.07 82.68 68.81 85.97 57.86 81.68 85.56 85.56 83.64
ART 85.44 86.41 77.07 86.07 81.70 83.14 85.54 84.99 71.04 89.42 56.69 84.72 87.64 87.89 86.02
Table 4: Attributional Robustness on
CIFAR-10 for other attribution methods
Model Gradient[56] GradSHAP [34]IN K IN K
Natural 13.72 9.5 4.5 16.52
PGD-10 [36] 54.8 54.06 45.05 59.80
ART 76.07 70.31 48.31 62.35
Fig. 6: Cosine between x and∇xf(x)y for
different models over test-set of CIFAR-10
5 Discussion and Ablation Studies
To understand the scope and impact of the proposed training approach ART, we perform
various experiments and report these findings in this section. These studies were carried
out on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Robustness to targeted attribution attacks: In targeted attribution attacks, the aim is
to calculate perturbations that minimize dissimilarity between the attribution map of a
given image and a target image’s attribution map. We evaluate the robustness of ART
model using targeted attribution attack as proposed in [15] using the IG attribution
method on a batch of 1000 test examples. To obtain the target attribution maps, we
randomly shuffle the examples and then evaluate ART and PGD-10 trained model on
these examples. The kendall’s tau coefficient and top-k intersection similarity measure
between original and perturbed images on ART was 64.76 and 70.64 as compared to
36.29 and 31.81 on the PGD-10 adversarially trained model.
Attributional robustness for other attribution methods: We show the efficacy of
ART against attribution attack [19] using gradient[56] and gradSHAP[34] attribution
methods in Table 4. We observe that ART achieves higher attributional robustness than
Natural and PGD-10 models on Top-k intersection (IN) and Kendall’s tau coefficient
(K) measure. We also compare the cosine similarity between x and gy(x) for all mod-
els trained on CIFAR-10 dataset and show its variance plot in Fig. 6. We can see that
ART trained model achieves higher cosine similarity Natural and PGD-10 models. This
empirically validates that our optimization is effective in increasing the spatial correla-
tion between image and gradient.
Robustness against gradient-free and stronger attacks: To show the absence of gra-
dient masking and obfuscation [6, 9], we evaluate our model on a gradient-free adver-
sarial optimization algorithm [66] and a stronger PGD attack with a larger number of
steps. We observe similar adversarial robustness when we increase the number of steps
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Fig. 7: Example images of weakly supervised segmentation masks obtained from different mod-
els via different attribution methods
in PGD-attack. For 100 step and 500 step PGD attacks, ART achieves 37.42 % and
37.18 % accuracy respectively. On the gradient-free SPSA [66] attack, ART obtains
44.7 adversarial accuracy that was evaluated over 1000 random test samples.
Robustness to common perturbations [23] and spatial adversarial perturbations
[17]: We compare ART with PGD-10-based adversarially trained model on the com-
mon perturbations dataset [23] for CIFAR-10. The dataset consists of perturbed images
of 15 common-place visual perturbations at five levels of severity, resulting in 75 dis-
tinct corruptions. We report the mean accuracy over severity levels for all 15 types of
perturbations and observe that ART achieves better generalization than other models
on a majority of these perturbations, as shown in Table 3. On PGD-40 `2 norm attack
with  = 1.0 and spatial attack [17] we observe robustness of 39.65%, 11.13% for ART
and 29.68%, 6.76% for PGD-10 trained model, highlighting the improved robustness
provided by our method. We show more results on varying  in adversarial attacks and
combining PGD adversarial training [36] with ART in Appendix C.
Image Segmentation: Data annotations collection for image segmentation task is time-
consuming and costly. Hence, recent efforts [31, 67, 68, 28, 45, 78, 44] have focused on
weakly supervised segmentation models, where image labels are leveraged instead of
segmentation masks. Since models trained via our approach perform well on WSOL, we
further evaluate it on weakly supervised image segmentation task for Flowers dataset
[43] where we have access to segmentation masks of 849 images. Samples of weakly-
supervised segmentation mask obtained from attribution maps on various models are
shown in Fig. 7. We observe that attribution maps of ART can serve as a better prior
for segmentation masks as compared to other baselines. We evaluate our results using
Top-1 Seg metric which considers an answer as correct when the model prediction is
correct and the IoU betweeen ground-truth mask and estimated mask is atleast 0.5. We
compare ART against Natural and PGD-7 trained models using gradient[56] and IG
[62] based attribution map. Attribution maps are converted into gray-scale heatmaps
and a smoothing filter is applied as a post-processing step. We obtain a Top-1 Seg per-
formance of 0.337, 0.422, and 0.604 via IG attribution maps and 0.244, 0.246, 0.317
via gradient maps for Natural, PGD-7 and ART models respectively.
Effect of β, λ and a on performance: We perform experiments to study the role of β,
λ and a as used in Algorithm 1 on the model performance by varying one parameter
and fixing the others on their best-performing values, i.e. 50, 0.5 and 3 respectively.
Fig. 8 shows the plots of attributional robustness. Fig. 9 shows the plots of test accuracy
and adversarial accuracy on `∞ PGD-40 perturbations with  = 8/255 along varying
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Fig. 8: Top-k Intersection (IN) and Kendall correlation (K) measure of attributional robustness
on varying β, λ and attack steps in our training methodology on CIFAR-10
Fig. 9: Test accuracy and adversarial accuracy (PGD-40 perturbations) on varying β, λ and attack
steps in our training methodology on CIFAR-10
parameters. From Fig. 9, we observe that adversarial accuracy initially increases with
increasing β, but the trend reverses for higher values of β. Similar is the trend for
attributional robustness on varying β as can be seen from the Fig. 8. On varying λ,
we find that the attributional and adversarial robustness of the model increases with
increasing λ and saturates after 0.75. However, the test accuracy starts to suffer as the
magnitude of λ increases. For attack steps parameter a, we find that the performance in
terms of test accuracy, adversarial accuracy and attributional robustness saturates after
3 as shown in the right-side plot of Fig. 8 and Fig. 9.
6 Conclusion
We propose a new method for the problem space of attributional robustness, using the
observation that increasing the alignment between the object in an input and the attribu-
tion map generated from the network’s prediction leads to improvement in attributional
robustness. We empirically showed this for both un-targeted and targeted attribution
attacks over several benchmark datasets. We showed that the attributional robustness
also brings out other improvements in the network, such as reduced vulnerability to
adversarial attacks and common perturbations. For other vision tasks such as weakly
supervised object localization, our attributionally robust model achieves a new state-
of-the-art accuracy even without being explicitly trained to achieve that objective. We
hope that our work can open a broader discussion around notions of robustness and the
application of robust features on other downstream tasks.
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Appendix
A Attributional Robustness: Additional Details and Results
In this section, we provide details of the datasets as mentioned in the main paper (Sec-
tion 4.1), as well as some additional results on attributional robustness.
We qualitatively show in Figure 10 that attribution maps generated via ART are
robust to attribution manipulation unlike Natural model. We also report the Top-1000
Intersection and Kendalls Correlation between original and perturbed saliency maps
for ART and Natural models. We use target attribution attack as mentioned in [15] to
perturb the attributions while keeping the predictions same. For images in Figure 10,
the model predictions are correct and the attribution maps are computed using Inte-
grated Gradient [62]. We observe that attributions of the Natural model are visually and
quantitatively fragile as attributions are easily manipulated to resemble target attribu-
tion map that is present in the rightmost column of the figure. However, it can seen from
the figure that ART models show high robustness to attribution manipulations.
A.1 Choice of optimization objective Lattr and its variants
Our choice for the loss function was based on the empirical analysis as reported in table
5 on CIFAR-10. We empirically observed that instead of directly minimizing `2 dis-
tance between x and gy(x) in Equation 4 of main paper, cosine distance led to better
robustness. We believe this is because cosine avoids scale mismatch issues in x and
gy(x) magnitudes. The triplet loss is only introduced to improve performance on attri-
butional robustness objective. For negative sample selection, we choose i∗ as second
most likely class, which represents most uncertainty, following standard principles of
hard negative mining in triplet loss [24, 52]. For other choices of i∗ , we observed a
performance drop.
A.2 Cosine distance in Lattr loss
Following our discussion in Sec 3.2 of the main paper, we now elaborate on the relation
of cosine distance in a unit `2-norm surface of vectors with Euclidean distance. We show
below that squared Euclidean distance is proportional to the cosine distance for unit `2
norm space of vectors. Euclidean distance is a valid distance function and follows the
triangle inequality which we use in Eqn 3 for obtaining the upper bound on attributional
robustness as a function of the distance between an image and its attribution map.
Given two vectors x and x˜, with unit `2 norm i.e. ||x||2 = 1 and ||x˜||2 = 1, cosine
distance between them is related to their Euclidean distance as follows:
(||x− x˜||2)2 = (x− x˜)>.(x− x˜)
= x>x+ x˜>x˜− 2.x>.x˜
= ||x||2 + ||x˜||2 − 2.x>.x˜ = 1 + 1− 2.x>.x˜
= 2(1− x>.x˜) = 2.CosineDistance(x, x˜)
(10)
20 M. Singh et al.
Fig. 10: Targeted attribution attack [15] using integrated gradient (IG) attribution map on Nat-
ural and ART trained model. Top-1000 intersection and Kendall correlation between IG attri-
bution map of original and perturbed images is shown below each image. The target attribution
manipulation uses the attribution map as depicted in the rightmost column of this figure.
Attributional Robustness Training using Input-Gradient Spatial Alignment 21
Table 5: Comparison of different loss functions used as the objective function for increasing
attributional robustness on CIFAR-10
Optimization Objective Attributional Robustness Test Accuracy AdversarialAccuracyIN K
Equation 2 74.78 71.40 91.34 15.15
Equation 4 : `2 distance 68.41 69.75 91.66 16.64
Equation 4 : Cosine distance 91.25 89.28 89.21 35.95
Equation 5 : ART
with i∗=argmin(logit) 90.75 83.32 89.94 37.93
Equation 5 : ART (ours) 92.90 91.76 89.84 37.50
A.3 Dataset and Implementation Details
Below, we describe the datasets and hyper-parameters used for experiments, which we
could not include in the main paper owing to space constraints.
SVHN
Data and Model: SVHN dataset [42] consists of images of digits obtained from house
numbers in Google Street View images, with 73257 digits for training and 26032 digits
for testing over 10 classes. We perform experiments on SVHN using WideResNet-40-2
[73] architecture for training on reported approaches.
Hyperparameters for Training:
Natural: We use SGD optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.1, momentum of 0.9,
l2 weight decay of 2e−4 and batch size of 256. We train it for 200 epochs with a learn-
ing rate schedule decay of 0.1 at 50th, 80th and 0.5 at 150th epoch.
PGD-7: We use the training configuration as in [37] to perform 7-step adversarial train-
ing with  = 8/255 and step size 2.5/255.
ART: We use the same training configuration as mentioned for Natural model, β = 50
and λ = 0.5. We calculate x˜ using  = 8/255, step size 1.5/255 and number of steps
a = 3.
CIFAR-10
Data and Model: CIFAR-10 dataset [32] consists of 50000 training images for 10 classes
with resolution of 32 × 32 × 3. We normalize the images with its mean and standard
deviation for training. We train a WideResNet28-10 [73] model for all the experiments
on this dataset.
Hyperparameters for Training:
Natural: We use SGD optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.1, momentum of 0.9, l2
weight decay of 2e−4 and batch size of 256. We train it for 100 epochs with a learning
rate schedule decay of 0.1 at 50th, 80th and 0.5 at 150th epoch.
PGD-10: We use the training configuration as mentioned in [37] to perform 10-step
adversarial training with  = 8/255 and step size 2/255.
ART: We use the same training configuration as mentioned for Natural model with
22 M. Singh et al.
β = 50 and λ = 0.5. We calculate x˜ using  = 8/255, step size 1.5/255 and number
of steps a = 3.
GTSRB
Data and Model: German Traffic Signal Recognition Benchmark [61] consists of 43
classes of traffic signals with 34, 799 training images, 4, 410 validation images and
12, 630 test images. We resize the images to 32 × 32 × 3 and normalize the images
with its mean and standard deviation for training. To balance the number of images
for each class, we use data augmentation techniques consisting of rotation, translation,
and projection transforms to extend the training set to 10, 000 images per class as in
[13]. We train WideResNet28-10 [73] model for carrying out experiments related to
this dataset.
Hyperparameters for Training:
Natural: We use SGD optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.1, momentum of 0.9,
l2 weight decay of 2e−4 and batch size of 128. We train it for 12 epochs with a learning
rate schedule decay of 0.1 at 4th, 6th and 0.5 at 10th epoch.
PGD-7: We use the training configuration same as [13] to perform 7-step adversarial
training with  = 8/255 and step size 2/255.
IG Norm and IG-Sum Norm [13]: We report the accuracy as mentioned in the paper
[13].
ART: We use the same training configuration as mentioned for Natural model with
β = 50 and λ = 0.5. We calculate x˜ using  = 8/255, step size 1.5/255 and number
of steps a = 3.
Flower
Data and Model: Flower dataset [43] has 17 categories with 80 images for each class.
We resize the images to 128 × 128 × 3 and normalize it with its mean and standard
deviation for training. The training set consists of 1, 224 images with 72 images per
class. The test set compromises of 136 images with 8 images per class. We use standard
data augmentation techniques of rotation, translation, and projection transforms to ex-
tend the training data so that each class contains 1, 000 training examples as proposed
in [13]. We use WideResNet28-10 [73] model for the reported approaches.
Hyperparameters for Training:
Natural: We use SGD optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.1, momentum of 0.9,
l2 weight decay of 2e−4 and batch size of 128. We train it for 68 epochs with a learning
rate schedule decay of 0.1 at 15th, 35th and 0.5 at 50th epoch.
PGD-7[36]: We use the training configuration as mentioned in [37] to perform 7-step
adversarial training with  = 8/255 and step size 2.5/255.
IG Norm and IG-Sum Norm [13] : We report the accuracy as mentioned in the paper
[13].
ART: We use the same training configuration as mentioned for Natural model with
λ = 0.5 and β = 50. We calculate x˜ using  = 8/255, step size 1.5/255 and number
of steps a = 3.
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Fig. 11: Variance box plot of Attributional Robustness measure for different models on Kendall
Correlation (left) and Top-k Intersection (right) for 1000 test samples of CIFAR-10
Fig. 12: Attributional robustness on varying  for ART, PGD-10 and Natural models on CIFAR-
10
Attack Methodology and Evaluation
For evaluation, we perform the Top-K variant of Iterative Feautre Importance Attack
(IFIA) proposed by [19]. Feature importance function is taken as Integrated Gradients
[62], and dissimilarity function is Kendall Correlation. The hyperparameters used are
the same as in [13] i.e. for CIFAR-10, SVHN and GTSRB datasets, k in top-k is 100,
 is 8/255, number of steps is 50 and step-size is 1/255. For the Flowers dataset, k
is 1000,  is 8/255, number of steps is 100 and step-size is 1/255. We also show the
comparison by varying  on CIFAR-10 dataset in Section A.4. Evaluation is also similar
to [13] using Top-k intersection and Kendall correlation measure and we report both
numbers as percentage values. For Top-k intersection, k is 100 for CIFAR-10, SVHN
and GTSRB datasets, and 1000 for Flowers dataset.
A.4 Additional Analysis on CIFAR-10
Attributional Robustness: In Fig 11, we show the variance box plot of Kendall Correla-
tion and Top-k Intersection with  = 8/255 for Natural, ART and PGD-10 [36] models
on CIFAR-10. ART has higher attributional robustness with the least variance as com-
pared to other approaches across 1000 samples randomly selected from the test dataset.
We also measure the attributional robustness of models on varying  to the standard
values of 2/255, 4/255, 8/255 and 12/255 in the attack methodology as explained in
Section A.3. Figure 12 shows the Top-k Intersection and Kendall correlation measure
for the same. We can see that ART outperforms PGD-10 and Natural model over all
choices of .
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Fig. 13: Examples of estimated bounding box and heatmap by ResNet50 model trained via our
approach on randomly chosen images of CUB dataset; Red bounding box is ground truth and
green bounding box corresponds to the estimated box
B Weakly Supervised Localization: More Details and Results
In this section, we provide more details of the dataset used for the results presented
in the main paper on weakly supervised localization (Section 4.2), as well as more
qualitative examples for these experiments.
B.1 Dataset and Implementation Details
We begin by describing the dataset used in experiments for weakly supervised localiza-
tion, which we could not include in the main paper owing to space constraints.
Dataset and Model: CUB-200 [69] is an image dataset of 200 different bird species
(mostly North American) with 11, 788 images in total. The information as a bounding
box around each bird is also available. We finetune a ResNet-50 [22] model pre-trained
on ImageNet for the reported approaches as in [14].
Hyper-parameters for training
Natural: We use SGD optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.01, momentum of 0.9
and l2 weight decay of 1e−4. We train the model for 200 epochs with batch size 128
and learning rate decay of 0.1 at every 60 epochs.
PGD-7 [36]: We use same hyper-parameters as natural training with  = 2/255. and
step size = 0.5/255. for calculating adversarial examples.
ART: We use SGD optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.01, momentum of 0.9 and
l2 weight decay of 1e−4. We decay the learning rate by 0.1 at every 40 epoch till 200
epochs and train with a batch size of 90. While calculating Lattr loss, we took mean
over channels of images and gradients. Values of other hyper-parameters are  = 2/255,
step size = 1.5/255, a = 3, λ = 0.5 and β = 50.
B.2 Qualitative Analysis
Figure 13 shows the estimated bounding box and heatmap derived from gradient based
attribution [56] on randomly sampled images for ResNet50 model trained via our ap-
proach. We observe that the estimated bounding box sometimes does not capture the
complete object in cases where birds have extended wings, or the bird is in an occluded
area with branches and twigs. Although, we observe qualitatively that this issue also
exists for other models [14].
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Fig. 14: `∞ and `2 adversarial robustness on varying  of ART, PGD-10 and Natural model on
CIFAR-10
Table 6: Comparison of Adversarial accuracy of different baseline models using transfer-based
black-box attacks on CIFAR-10
Training Approach
Adversarial perturbation
created using Clean Test
AccuracyNatural PGD-10 ART
Natural 0.00 80.35 49.09 95.26
PGD-10 86.44 44.07 71.34 87.32
ART 88.45 72.72 37.58 89.84
C Adversarial Robustness
In this section, we provide additional results on adversarial robustness on the CIFAR-10
dataset.
Adversarial Robustness on `∞ and `2 PGD Perturbations with Varying  To analyze
the adversarial robustness of ART model, we report and compare accuracy of the ART
model and the PGD-10 adversarially trained model over `∞ and `2 PGD perturbations
for different values of  on CIFAR-10. In Figure 14, we can observe that ART adver-
sarial robustness for `∞ perturbations is similar to PGD-10 for  less than 4/255 and
better for various values of `2 perturbations.
Transfer-based black-box attacks We analyse the adversarial robustness of ART mod-
els on transfer-based black box attacks. Specifically, we compute the adversarial per-
turbations on the test set of CIFAR-10 for different baseline models and evaluate its
adversarial accuracy on ART. We see that the transfer of adversarial perturbation from
ART is much better than PGD-10 on Natural model. ART also shows higher robustness
than PGD-10 for transfer attack from Natural model as reported in table 6.
Comparison with other training techniques for adversarial robustness: We consider
JARN[11] and CURE[41], which are recently proposed training techniques for adver-
sarial robustness that are different from adversarial training [36]. We compare the ad-
versarial robustness of these techniques with ART on CIFAR-10 dataset using a `∞
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PGD-20 adversarial perturbation with  = 8/255. JARN, CURE and ART show adver-
sarial accuracy of 15.5%, 41.4% and 37.73% respectively and test accuracy of 93.9%,
83.1% and 89.84% respectively.
UsingLattr+Lce to Compute Perturbations x˜ With the motive to combine the benefits
from attributional and adversarial robust models, we augment the loss function of our
approach with adversarial loss [36]. We observe that the model achieves test accuracy
of 85.33 and adversarial accuracy of 52.31 on PGD-40 `∞ attack with  = 8/255 as
compared to the PGD-10 model which has 87.32 test accuracy and 44.07 adversarial
accuracy. The attributional robustness measure of Top-k intersection and kendall corre-
lation using Integrated Gradients is 74.24 and 77.86 which is less than the attributional
robustness of ART model but is ∼ 5% better than PGD-10 model.
